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HEALING FAIR DEALING? A COMPARATIVE
COPYRIGHT ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN FAIR DEALING
TO UK FAIR DEALING AND US FAIR USE
Giuseppina D’Agostino*

I. INTRODUCTION
As a result of the March 4, 2004 Supreme Court of Canada decision in
CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada1 for the first time in
Canadian copyright history, the court determined that Canadian law must
recognize a “user right” to carry on exceptions generally and fair dealing
in particular. Whereas the notion of exceptions before this decision was
premised on a narrow interpretation of the scope of the exceptions, the
Supreme Court has raised what was a narrow exception to the level of
general principle. Thus, it is important in the ongoing project of copyright
policy reform to probe the meaning of this ruling since it would affect
potential policy work on exceptions, and especially how the notion of fair
dealing is conceived and applied.
This paper proceeds in six parts. Part II examines the significance of CCH
in rooting a user right. At this early juncture, it is useful to step back and
revisit pre-CCH cases often seen as user unfriendly and then gaze forward
into the post-CCH jurisprudential scene. Having set out the Canadian fair
dealing legislative and jurisprudential landscape, the paper begins to
explore this legal backdrop in other jurisdictions. UK fair dealing and US
fair use are respectively examined in Parts III and IV. In discussing US
fair use, particular attention is made to the flurry of criticism against it,
with specific reference to the educational sector. Part V then compares the
*
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three jurisdictions. It is observed that because of CCH, the Canadian
common law factors are more flexible than those entrenched in the US.
For the UK, certain criteria have emerged from the caselaw consonant to
Canada’s pre-CCH framework and in many ways there is now a hierarchy
of factors with market considerations at the fore. The real differences,
however, ultimately lie in the policy preoccupations held by the respective
courts, with Canada’s top court alone concerned in championing user
rights above all other rights.
In the spirit of attaining copyright balance, some conclusions, by way of
potential solutions, are advanced in Part VI. The main focus of this paper
is on the applicable legislation and jurisprudence, although as will become
apparent the solutions may (and should) also lie outside (and
complimentary to) the realm of the law and the courts. While doing
nothing does not seem to be the appropriate response, legal intervention
may not be warranted either. Rather than, or at the very least together
with, reforming the law, establishing fair dealing best practices is most
promising. The parties directly affected in a specific industry can together
develop these guidelines to ultimately aid in clearer and ongoing fairer fair
dealing decision-making in the courts. It is here that US initiatives can
serve as most fruitful to emulate.
While this paper investigates the legislative and jurisprudential landscape
of fair dealing, it recognizes that there are other matters such as the role of
contract and technology which also affect fair dealing/fair use. As argued
elsewhere, the role of contract in copyright law cannot be underestimated.2
Contract law can promote and undermine fair dealing. Contracts can
promote and undermine users and creators and any party in the copyright
system for that matter. It is thus important to assess how the role of
contract is embedded in the Canadian Copyright Act3 (“CCA”) and how it
2

The critical role of contract law in copyright law, or copyright contract is a recurring
preoccupation of mine: G D’Agostino “Canada’s Robertson Ruling: Any Practical
Significance for Copyright Treatment of Freelance Authors?” [2007] EIPR 66; G
D’Agostino “Freelance Authors for Free: Globalisation of Publishing, Convergence of
Copyright Contracts and Divergence of Judicial Reasoning” in F Macmillan (ed) New
Directions in Copyright (Edward Elgar Cheltenham 2005) 166 and G D’Agostino
“Copyright Treatment of Freelance Work in the Digital Era” (2002) 19 Santa Clara
Computer and High Technology LJ 37.

3

Copyright Act RSC 1985 c C-42 (“CCA”).
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is deployed in practice to promote and temper the desired results—
presumably the objectives of balance where the interests of creators, users,
rights holders and the general public are considered.
Moreover, the relationship between technology and fair dealing/fair use is
equally material. Like contract, technology can also undermine and
promote the various copyright stakeholder interests. The link between
technology and fair dealing/fair use and other exceptions has been
specifically examined in the US and the findings are negative.4 If fair
dealing is to be preserved, then technologies cannot undermine its
functioning. The CCA needs to be mindful of this dynamic. And so, while
each of these matters are critical and will be raised throughout this paper
where relevant, a fuller analysis is left for another time and place. Equally
important and beyond the scope of complete analysis are the actual
practices of stakeholders as for instance borne out in business models
steadily evolving to embrace technology and promote the goals of easy
and open access. The software open access movements and the Creative
Commons are some models complementing some of the ethics of fair
dealing. Last, because this paper is limited to the domestic and
comparative aspects of fair dealing, it is at this time untenable to assess the
international dimensions of the issue. Other scholars have begun to do so.5
For the immediate future, it does not seem as though CCH would be cause
for concern in violating Berne’s three-step test for instance. Should the
courts apply CCH expansively, this may trigger international scrutiny of
the legislation. To date, there have been no such conflicts.

4

See text to nn 172-197.

5

D Gervais “The Purpose of Copyright Law in Canada” (2005) UOTLJ 315-356.
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II. FAIR DEALING IN CANADA
A. LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT
In Canada, the doctrine of fair dealing is statutorily entrenched in the
CCA. Since its inception, fair dealing has been twice amended.6 Section
29 provides:
“Research or Private Study” (Section 29)
Fair dealing for the purpose of research or private study does not
infringe copyright.
“Criticism or Review” (Section 29.1)
Fair dealing for the purpose of criticism or review does not infringe
copyright if the following are mentioned:
(a) the source; and
(b) if given in the source, the name of the
author, in the case of a work,
performer, in the case of a performer’s performance,
maker, in the case of a sound recording, or
broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal.
“News Reporting” (Section 29.2)
Fair dealing for the purpose of news reporting does not infringe
copyright if the following are mentioned:
(a) the source; and
(b) if given in the source, the name of the
author, in the case of a work,
(ii) performer, in the case of a performer’s performance,
(iii) maker, in the case of a sound recording, or
(iv) broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal.

6

North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act SC 1993 c 44 s 64(1) in
force January 1, 1994, as ss 27(2) (a.1); then by an Act to amend the Copyright Act SC
1997 c 24 s 18, in force September 1, 1997, as s 29.2 (which remains the current
provision of the Act)
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Traditionally, scholars, practitioners and the courts have construed fair
dealing as a defence to copyright infringement. To make out a defence, the
defendant had to prove that: (1) the action fit within one of the enumerated
purposes (eg research or private study, research or criticism and news
reporting) (2) the action was fair and (3) in the case of the last two
categories, there was acknowledgment of the source. Typically, the
enumerated grounds were interpreted as exhaustive as any purpose not
falling strictly within an enumerated ground infringed.7 However, as
shown below, this may no longer be the case post CCH.
The CCA also contains specific exceptions for educational institutions and
libraries, archives, and museums (commonly referred to as LAMs) and
photocopying in LAMs, archives, ephemeral recordings and person’s with
disabilities.8 These exceptions are meant to be TRIPs compliant, as
limitations and exceptions confined to “certain special cases which do not
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.”9 Of note is that a
court may rely on public interest grounds for allowing an otherwise
infringing activity, but this common law power has been rarely exercised
in Canada or in the UK, where it was invented.10

7

Michelin v CAW Canada [1997] 2 FC 306 denying parody.

8

CCA (n 3) ss 29.4 – 30.4.

9

The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods (15 Apr 1994) Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments–Results of the Uruguay Round vols
31-33 ILM 1197 (“TRIPS”) art 13 incorporating art 9(2) of the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic works (9 Sept 1886) 168 Consol TS 1853 (the socalled “three-step test).
10

D Vaver “Canada’s Intellectual Property Framework: A Comparative Overview”
(2004) 17 IPJ 125, 149; the defence only gained judicial notice once in Canada in R v
James Lorimer & Co [1984] 1 FC 1065 (CA) in relation to Crown copyright, but was not
ultimately applied.

6
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B. ANALYZING CCH
1. CCH CANADIAN LTD V LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA
In CCH, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that the Law Society of Upper
Canada did not infringe copyright as its Great Library request-based
reproduction services fell squarely within the allowances of the fair
dealing doctrine. At issue were the single copies of reported decisions,
case summaries, statutes, regulations and text selections reproduced
pursuant to the Great Library Access Policy.11 According to the court,
section 29 of the CCA, alongside the other exceptions, “must not be
interpreted restrictively.”12 The enumerated purposes should be accorded
“large and liberal interpretation” in order to ensure that “users’ rights” are
not unduly constrained, and is not limited to non-commercial or private
contexts.13 In this case, lawyers carrying on the business of law for profit
were held to be conducting non-infringing research.
The court explained that to prove that a dealing was fair pursuant to CCA
s 29, the defendant Law Society had the onus to prove (1) that the dealing
was for the purpose of either research or private study and (2) that it was
fair. Up to this point, the issues presented are consistent with those of a
traditional fair dealing test in Canada and the UK.
As the court begins its analysis of the fair dealing doctrine—and drawing
from UK and US approaches—it endorses certain factors which may be
more or less relevant in future fair dealing cases. It also acknowledges that
there may be other unnamed factors that could be used to assess the
fairness of a dealing. Significantly, the court collapses an evaluation of
whether the use could be construed as “research or private study” into the
second analytical stage—whether the dealing was fair. In doing so, the
first “hurdle” becomes one of the factors that is more or less relevant. In
this way, the court softens the need to adhere to the traditional strictures of
11

While the issue of authorization of copyright infringement was also material for the
purposes of this paper, this issue will not be addressed.

12

CCH (n 1) [48].

13

ibid [51].
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proving fair dealing and puts into practice its assertion that the enumerated
purposes require a liberal interpretation.
Below follows the court’s six factors as construed and applied in the
context of the case.
a. PURPOSE (AND COMMERCIAL NATURE) OF THE DEALING
The court asserts that this first criterion “should not be given restrictive
interpretation or this could result in undue restriction of users’ rights.”14
Courts should adopt an objective test to assess the users’ real purpose or
motive in using the copyrighted work. The Great Library’s Access Policy
states that its patrons making a request must delineate a legitimate purpose
of use and where any ambiguity arises, the matter is referred to the
Reference Librarian. For the court, this policy provided reasonable
safeguards that the materials were being used for the purpose of research
and private study.
The commercial nature of the dealing is an important consideration—
research done for commercial purposes may not be as fair as research done
for research purposes. However, the court emphasizes that research is “not
limited to non-commercial or private contexts.”15 While the court does not
clearly state that commercial research is fair dealing, it states that it
certainly can be.
b. THE CHARACTER OF THE DEALING
Here the focus is on how the works were dealt with, for instance multiple
copies widely distributed can be unfair. In the Law Society’s case this
factor was met favourably: only single copies were made available to
individual members of the legal profession.16 Further, if the copy is
destroyed after it is used this may favour a finding of fairness. Courts can
also consider the custom or practice in the industry to assess fairness. It is
14

ibid [54].

15

ibid [51].

16

ibid [67].
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unclear whose perspective in the industry should be valued. Relying on
custom can be dangerous since custom is often unilateral and often set by
the party with the greater bargaining power.17 Arguably should the
educators’ or students’ perspective be considered (who may be using
works in an infringing fashion in certain circumstances) there could be fair
dealing. Or alternatively, if the right holder’s perspective is valued, custom
could work against users. As the court did not expressly apply custom, it
will be challenging to anticipate its applicability to future cases. Courts, of
course, can (and should) rely on the existing body of caselaw in copyright
and contract law to assess custom.18 The custom is implied by “the custom
of a locality or by the usage of a particular trade” and “must be strictly
proved.”19
c. THE AMOUNT OF THE DEALING
This factor seems to be a weaker consideration. The logic goes like this:
the larger the taking the less the fair dealing. But of course, in several
circumstances, as in the case of photographs it may be impossible to deal
fairly with the work without copying the entire work. The court notes that
for the purpose of research and private study it may be essential to copy an
“entire academic article or an entire judicial decision.”20 This wholesale
inclusion would not likely be the case for the purposes of criticism or
review in the case of literature. Research and private study is thus
accorded wider scope under the court’s reading of fair dealing. On the
amount of the dealing, the court relied on the Great Library’s Access
Policy that it would exercise discretion to ensure fair dealing. In most
17

As seen in the case of freelance journalists and their publishers in Canada where
publishers relied on their “custom” to justify digital reproduction of the authors’ works
without the authors’ permission or due payment; see G D’Agostino (2007) (n 3).

18

G D’Agostino “Anticipating Robertson: Defining Copyright Ownership of Freelance
works in New Media” (18)(1) Cahiers de Propriété Intellectuelle 2006 tr « En attendant
Robertson : Définir la possession du droit d'auteur sur les œuvres des pigistes dans les
nouveaux médias » 166.

19

This high standard requires that the custom is (1) notorious, (2) as certain as a written
contract, and (3) reasonable: Beatson Anson’s Law of Contract (28th edn OUP Oxford
2002) 151.

20

CCH (n 1) [56].
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occasions, only one judgment was copied and for secondary materials,
when the requested amount was more than 5 per cent, a request could be
refused. There was no evidence that the Great Library received and
supplied multiple copy requests.
d. ALTERNATIVES TO THE DEALING
Here two criteria may lead a court against a fair finding where (a) there
was a non-copyrighted work available as an alternative and (b) where the
use of the copyrighted work was not reasonably necessary to achieve the
“ultimate purpose.”21 For instance, criticism could be equally effective by
not actually reproducing the copyrighted work—this may weigh against
fair dealing.22
In CCH, the court remarks that there were no alternatives to the Great
Library’s photocopying service as (1) twenty per cent of the Great Library
patrons were outside Toronto and (2) researchers were not allowed to
borrow materials from the Great Library, thus justifying the need for
copying.23 Curiously, the court focuses more on the ease to access the
works, than on the actual availability of non-copyrighted works.
The court posits that the availability of a licence is irrelevant to weighing
whether there were alternatives to the dealing. Accordingly, only because
a user failed to obtain a licence should not be interpreted as proof that the
dealing was not fair. If this were the case, the owners’ monopoly would be
extended beyond the objective of balance in the CCA. As such, if a
dealing clearly falls into fair dealing in the first place, that dealing should
not be subject to a licence. This analysis seems consonant with several
stakeholder positions within the educational community that there exists a

21

ibid.

22

A comparative instance of this is in Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland and others
[2001] Ch 143 (CA) (“Hyde Park”) [40] where publishing photographs of Lady Diana
was merely gratuitous; having described any relevant portion of the photos would have
sufficed and did not require reproduction.

23

CCH (n 1) [69].
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clear for fear culture to obtain often unnecessary licences out of excessive
caution.24
e. NATURE OF THE WORK
According to the court if the work is unpublished, the dealing may be
more fair “in that its reproduction with acknowledgement could lead to a
wider public dissemination of the work.”25 While the court remarks that
this would serve one of the goals of copyright it is nonetheless a departure
from previous Canadian caselaw. Equally, as noted below, this reasoning
is contrary to the UK and US caselaw.26 The court suggests that
protecting the author and furthering wide public dissemination are two
conflicting objectives. One cannot further public dissemination if the
priority is to protect (and presumably reward) the author. One factor that
may soften this anti-author perspective is if the work in question were
confidential in nature.27

24

In
Canada,
see
CMEC
“Copyright
in
Education”
<http://cmec.ca/copyright/copyInternet.en.stm> (last visited June 29, 2007); M Wilkinson
“Filtering the Flow from the Fountains of Knowledge” Ch 12 in M Geist (ed) In the
Public Interest (Irwin Law Toronto 2005) 331. In the US: W Fisher et al “The Digital
Learning Challenge: Obstacles to Educational Uses of Copyrighted Material in the
Digital Age – A Foundational White Paper” Harvard Law School Research Publication
No
2006-09
(Berkman
Center
for
Internet
and
Society)
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/files/copyrightandeducation.html> (visited 29 June
2007) (“White Paper”); J Urban and L Quilter “Efficient Process or ‘Chilling Effects?’
Takedown
Notices
Under
Section
512
of
the
DMCA”
<http://static.chillingeffects.org/Urban-Quilter-512-summary.pdf> (visited 29 June 2007)
(“Chilling Effects”).

25

CCH (n 1) [58].

26

In US they went as far as developing a presumption against fair dealing for
unpublished works see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc v Nation Enterprises 471 US 539
(SCt 1985) 546; later overruled in Fair Use of Unpublished Works Publ No 102-492
(1992) 102d Cong 2d Sess, 106 Sat 3145 codified at 17 USC 107; in UK, see Hyde Park
(n 22) and text to n 125.

27

In Hyde Park (n 22)[40] the court considered that the works were subject to an
agreement: “I do not believe that a fair minded and honest person would pay for the
dishonestly taken driveway stills and publish them in a newspaper knowing that they had
not been published or circulated…”

2007]

HEALING FAIR DEALING?

11

The Great Library easily met this factor as the works in question were
essential to legal research and were subject to its Access Policy stating that
the patron’s purpose to access the works must be for research, private
study, criticism, review or use in legal proceedings.28
f. EFFECT OF THE DEALING ON THE WORK
If the work in question competes with the market of the original work it is
less likely that the dealing will be found to be fair. In underscoring that the
market factor “is neither the only factor nor the most important factor’ the
court seems to suggest that this factor is less important than the others.
Interestingly, this “market substitute” factor seems to be more important in
the UK.29
There was no evidence advanced to indicate that there was an effect on the
publishers’ market. Rather, the publishers continued to produce new
reporter series and other legal publications during the period of the Great
Library’s request-based copying. The court acknowledges that while the
Law Society has the evidentiary burden, “it lacked access to evidence
about the effect of the dealing on the publishers’ market.”30 And so, this
decision suggests that the onus may be reversed if the defendant cannot
access market impact evidence. This seems fair as the publishers are often
the more sophisticated parties in a better position to access such records,
though potentially a tall order as it may involve crystal ball-gazing.31

2. CCH OBSERVATIONS: USER-CENTRIC APPROACH
From the analysis of the six factors it seems clear that the courts’ penchant
is pro-user. As further detailed below, this can be seen in particular in the
28

CCH (n 1) [71].

29

eg in Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1142 (CA)[106] it is the
most important factor.

30

CCH (n 1) [72].

31

See infra n 163.
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court’s language, liberal interpretation of fair dealing, its elevated status of
the doctrine as compared to other copyright exceptions, and its underlying
policy preoccupations.
a. DEFENCE TO USER RIGHT
Even before CCH, depending on the speaker’s perspective, various terms
were used to denote fair dealing such as “exceptions” “exemptions”
“defences” or “user rights”.32 Still, whereas in previous cases and as
featured in almost every textbook, fair dealing was conceived of as a
defence, CCH construes it more as a “right” and an “integral” part of
copyright law.33
b. EXPANDED PURPOSES
CCH advocates for a liberal approach to interpreting the purposes of the
dealing as these “should not be given restrictive interpretation.”34 In this
sense, new purposes could be included under the enumerated grounds.
Parody could be one of these. Significantly, the court considers the
purposes of research under the first of six factors, “purposes (and
commercial nature) of the dealing”. The court thus seems to soften the
rigidity of following the more traditional schematic approach (where it
first assessed whether the use fell under the enumerated purpose and then
examined fairness). Rather, the court collapses the first part of the
“purposes” analysis into the second part—assessing fairness. As indicated
below, here the court aligns itself with the more flexible US approach
where there are no enumerated grounds, but an open list of purposes.

32

Vaver (n 6) 148-49; P Esmail “CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada
Case Comment on a Landmark Copyright Case” (2005) 10 Appeal 13-24 [17].

33

For fair dealing as a defence pre CCH: see Allen v Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd
(1997) 152 DLR (4th) 518 [34]; for fair dealing as an exception: Boudreau v Lin 150 DLR
(4th) 324 (OCJ) Metivier J [48]; More recently, terms like “principle” have also been
used: M Bouchard “The Copyright Board: A Review of Some Recent Issues and Future
Challenges” (The Law Society of Upper Canada Entertainment, Advertising & Media
Law Symposium held in Toronto on April 27-28, 2007).

34

CCH (n 1) [54].
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c. EXPANDED WORKS
CCH clarifies that entire court decisions, typically under Crown copyright,
can be copied fully and fairly. Following this logic, this may be the case
with other government works, such as statutes, reports, and press releases.
d. EXCEPTIONS AND FAIR DEALING
CCH favours parties relying on fair dealing over other exceptions.35
While counsel’s arguments at the onset of CCH in 1993 were in large part
conditioned by the lack of the existing “libraries, archives, museums” or
“educational institutions” exceptions, the Supreme Court nonetheless
emphasized that an applicable user can always rely on the fair dealing
doctrine first:36 “It is IF when a library were unable to make out the fair
dealing exception under s. 29 that it would need to turn to s. 30.2 of the
Copyright Act to prove that it qualified for the library exemption.”37 The
court prefers the blessing of the fair dealing doctrine over reliance on
specific exceptions. This may be because, fair dealing, as construed by the
court, now allows for a more flexible framework.

e. CONSTRUCTING FAIR DEALING—INFRINGEMENT, BURDEN OF
PROOF AND AGENCY

In a traditional copyright infringement suit, the plaintiff has the burden of
proof to show infringement. The burden then shifts on the defendant to
advance a defence. The court seems to alter this progression in two ways:
(1) it skips over a traditional analysis of infringement and (2) it may shift
the onus of proof on the plaintiff for disproving fair dealing.

35

ibid. [49] “it is only if a library were unable to make out the fair dealing exception
under s 29 that it would need to turn to s 30.2 of the Copyright Act to prove that it
qualified for the library exemption”.

36

ibid.

37

CCH (n 1) [49].
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First, its discussion of infringement is limited to authorization of
infringement which is a different analysis than the typical “substantial part
doctrine” to infringement. Rather, having reasoned that there is no
authorization, the court proceeds immediately into a fair dealing analysis
by framing fair dealing as an exception to copyright.38 Second, the court
may shift the onus of proof in two ways, as it reasons that: (a) To establish
fair dealing, the defendant need not adduce evidence that every use of the
provided material was conducted fairly but can rely on its own general
practice.39 For instance, in the case of the Great Library, its internal
Access Policy—to photocopy only for purposes of research, review,
private study and criticism with a corresponding gate-keeper role by the
Reference Librarian for the copying of substantial secondary sources—
was seen as sufficient to show that its own practices were research-based
and fair and it need not have proven that each of its patrons dealt fairly
with the supplied materials.40 It is worth asking whether it is fair for
librarians to shoulder the burden to police fair dealing. On the other hand,
following rigid rules (eg establishing copy quotas through legislation)
while perhaps clearer to all parties, would be too restrictive and not
entirely reflective of the realities and goals of user experiences. Indeed,
imposing a copy quota is the approach taken in Australia where apparently
no more than ten percent of a work can be copied.41 Also vesting librarians
with this gate-keeping role may allow them to better prove fair dealing.
And (b) While the Law Society has the evidentiary burden, because it
could not access market impact evidence on the publishing market, the
court holds it more appropriate for the plaintiff publishers and not the
defendant users to make the case that they were negatively affected. The
court thus allows the Law Society the right to rely on the Great Library’s
38

ibid [51] “The fair dealing exception under s. 29…”

39

ibid [63].

40

Access Policy detailed at ibid [65].

41

Exposure Draft Part 4 of the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006: Exceptions and other
Digital
Agenda
Review
Measures
(October
2006).
<http://www.copyright.org.au/pdf/acc/Submissions/x0605.pdf>(visited 29 June 2007)14;
but see K Weatherall commentary that the Draft is crafted in such a bad way that it is
unclear as to what it actually does: <http://weatherall.blogspot.com/2006/10/oncopyright-amendment-bill-and-ipods.html> (visited 29 June 2007).
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general practice to establish fair dealing, rather than having to adduce
evidence. The court embraces the concept of agency.42 As illustrated in
Tariff 22,43 knowing of the potential of end user infringement, will not
absent express knowledge of end user infringing activity be seen as the
intermediary authorizing end user infringement.
f. CAUTIONARY NOTE ON CCH USER-CENTRIC POLICY
Any analysis of the state of copyright post-CCH, must be rooted in an
understanding of what the Supreme Court understands to be Parliament’s
policy objectives. The Supreme Court of Canada reaffirms its previous
ruling in Théberge that the CCA has supposedly dual objectives: “…a
balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward
for the creator…”44 The court maintains that the judiciary “should strive to
maintain an appropriate balance between these two goals.”45 The court
suggests that when copyright law promotes the encouragement and
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect this is in the public
interest. For the court, the chief method of attaining this is to protect user
rights. Rewarding the “creator” is an important part of Canada’s so-called
dualistic copyright objectives but presumably not as in the public interest.
CCH’s skewed expression of balance and the objectives of copyright law
is seen further in its discussion of the doctrine of originality. The court
maintains that when courts lower the standard of originality, the balance
tips more in favour of the author/creator at the loss of a robust public
domain to foster future creative innovation.46 While this may certainly be
plausible, more often than not, copyright assignments and therefore the
role of contract law (where the owner steps into the creator’s shoes) allows
for this erosion. In other words, understanding the dynamic relationship
42

Consistent with Wilkinson’s analysis (n 24) 346.

43

SOCAN v CAIP 2004 SCC 45 [88] also known as Tariff 22 decision (“Tariff 22”).

44

CCH [10] citing Théberge v Galerie d’Art due Petit Champlain Inc [2002] 2 SCR 336
at [30- 31]

45

CCH [10].

46

CCH (n 1) [24].
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between author and owner is also important when accounting for future
innovation and a robust public domain.
This perhaps ill-conceived copyright policy is matched by equally illconceived language. The court juxtaposes the public v. the creator in
grounding its objectives, but in framing the issues it states: “this case
requires this Court to interpret the scope of both owners’ and users’ right
under the Copyright Act…” 47 While the court notes the “creator” in its
discussion of balancing copyright objectives, the court matter-of-factly
replaces her with the term “owner” in the framing of the issues. Creators
and owners are not the same category of stakeholders for the purposes of
copyright.48 Their interests are often conflicting. One cannot easily replace
them as if they were synonyms as the court and many commentators often
do. Indeed, it is not entirely helpful when commentators argue that CCH
has “shifted the focus of copyright law from the pro-author approach that
had dominated in the past to a balanced approach that weighs the rights of
the author against those of the user.”49 And that as a result, “the law in
Canada is now that the courts must balance the interests of the authors of
works against the public interest.”50 This is unfortunate copyright parlance
in Canadian CCH commentary, and copyright generally.51
So while finally laudable that the court champions user rights, long
forgotten by Canadian legislatures and the judiciary, where do creators fit
in CCH? While the policy for creators is not central to CCH (perhaps
because for the most part the case deals with judges as creators, not the
(stereo)typical category of creators like musicians, freelance authors,
bloggers and so on), this oversight may limit future “balanced” rulings.
Would the court have reached a similar ruling if other categories of
creators were at issue? Robertson v Thomson Corp, dealing with freelance
47

ibid [13] [emphasis added].

48

As repeatedly argued in each of the noted publications at G D’Agostino (n 3).

49

Esmail (n 32) [3].

50

ibid [31].

51

But see M Geist “Strongest pro-user rights decisions in the world” Law Bytes Toronto
Star (22 March 2004) available at <www.michaelgeist.ca> where he interprets CCH as
attempting to balance user rights against those of owners and creators.
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authors, may decide such an issue, but the new trial is yet to make its way
in the courts.52 In CCH, judges and lawyers were creators whose works at
issue were decided and shaped by judges and lawyers. The ultimate goal
sought by the Great Library’s copy practices was to “help ensure that legal
professional in Ontario can access the materials necessary to conduct the
research required to carry on the practice of law.”53 This practice saves the
cost of additional hotel bills and other travel expenses to non-Toronto
lawyers and applies to self-represented litigants as well.54 Had the court
ruled otherwise, Toronto lawyers may have received an unfair advantage
over other members of the profession. Also, it has been argued that the
cost of legal services would have increased for clients had the publishers
been successful (lawyers would have had to pay extra for copies and
would pass on the cost to its clients).55 As a result, the Supreme Court was
intimately familiar with the practices and repercussions of deciding
otherwise. Still, these context-specific factors are not easily applicable to
other creative domains, where reaping from the copyrighted work is often
the sole source of income for other kinds of creators.

C. STATE OF JUDICIAL PLAY BEFORE CCH
Before CCH, the judiciary varied in its approach to fair dealing. Some
courts were more restrictive and others more liberal in their reasoning.

52

Updated as at 9 July 2007; see infra n 52.

53

CCH (n 1) [63].

54

Esmail (n )[28].

55

Law Society of Upper Canada “Notice to the Profession: Supreme Court of Canada
Releases CCH Canadian v Law Society of Upper Canada Copyright Decision.” Though it
seems that law societies were in discussion with Access Copyright nonetheless. The
Copyright Committee of the Federation reaffirmed to CanCopy (now Access Copyright)
its willingness to continue discussions with respect to possible blanket licenses for certain
copying activities by members of the legal profession: Law Society of Saskatchewan
“Copyright Notice to member of the Canadian Legal Profession form the National
Copyright Committee of the Federal of Law Societies of Canada” (14 Dec 1999).
<http://www.lawsociety.sk.ca/newlook/News/lawsuit3.htm> (29 June 2007); access
policies remain the same: <http://library.lsuc.on.ca/GL/services_access.htm>
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Factors like the motive of the dealing were also more pronounced, as were
the policies of copyright towards non-users.

1. RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION
Most commentators argue that pre-CCH there was a restrictive
interpretation of fair dealing.56 Many contend that copyright law has been
quite expansionist in protecting owner’s/creator’s rights (here the same
noted comments apply as scholarship has often conflated the two parties
long before CCH).57
Perhaps most illustrative of this approach is the Michelin v CAW Canada
case.58 In Michelin, the tire company sued a union for infringement for its
use of the Michelin man logo (the Bibendum) in union leaflets distributed
during a labour dispute.
The defendants unsuccessfully argued that the use of the Bibendum was a
parody and therefore an exception to copyright infringement under fair
dealing for the purposes of criticism. In placing the burden of proof
squarely with the defendants, the court ruled that parody was not an
exception to infringement within the CCA or within the jurisprudence.59
More pointedly, parody was not synonymous with criticism.60 The court
was adamant not to rely on US caselaw where parody could exist under
fair use.61 And even if the court were to have followed the US courts, fair
56

LE Harris “Editorial” (2004) Copyright and New Media Law Newsletter.

57

D’Agostino (n 3) arguing that in the context of mainstream publishing copyright law
increasingly favours right holders over authors; see also CJ Craig “Locke, Labour and
Limiting the Author’s Right: A Warning against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law”
(2002) 28 Queen’s LJ 1; A Drassinower “Taking User Rights Seriously” Ch 16 in M
Geist (ed) In the Public Interest (Irwin Law Toronto 2005) 462 and S Trosow “The
Illusive Search for Justificatory Theories: Copyright, Commodification and Capital”
(2003) 16 Can JL & Jur 217-224.

58

[1997] 2 FC 306 (“Michelin”).

59

ibid [60].

60

ibid [61].

61

ibid [63].
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dealing would still have failed since the other two requirements had not
been met, namely (1) the author’s name or the source of the work were
unmentioned and (2) there was no fair treatment.62 The court noted that
exceptions should be strictly interpreted and that fair dealing in particular
lists an exhaustive set of grounds.63 Accordingly, ruling otherwise would
create a new exception in the statute. In this light, Michelin was extremely
deferential to Parliament: “If Parliament had wanted to exempt parody as a
new exception under fair dealing it would have done so.”64
This case represents a clear shunning of following a US fair use approach
which was later expressly adopted in CCH. Against CCH, Michelin,
promoting a restrictive approach, no longer seems to be good law.

2. LIBERAL INTERPRETATION
But before CCH, there were also markings of a liberal interpretative
approach. In Allen v Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd 65 a freelance
photographer sued a newspaper publisher for copyright infringement for
reproducing a magazine cover which contained a photo he took on
commission. While the testimony from both sides on custom of the
industry resulted in divided views, the court ultimately ruled that the
photographer only held copyright in the photo and not in the cover which
was created by the magazine.66 The magazine did not object to reuse of its
62

Pursuant to then Copyright Act s 27(2)(a.1) court remarks this requirement made
pursuant to the North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of
Canada, the Government of Mexico and the Government of the United States, 17
December 1992 Can TS 1994 No 2, 32 ILM 289 (entered into force 1 January
1994)(“NAFTA”) s 64(1). “The substantial quantity of the original work used in the
leaflets and posters also casts doubt on the fairness of the defendant’s treatment.”
Michelin (n 58)[70].

63

Michelin (n 58) [65]; also relied on Bishop v Stevens [1990] 2 SCR 467.

64

Michelin (n 58) [71].

65

Allen (n 33).

66

ibid.
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cover and, in any event, the court found the fair dealing defence for the
purposes of news reporting applied.
The court overturned the trial decision ruling that fair dealing did not
apply to an entire copyrighted work. The court held that fair dealing is
“purposive” and not simply a mechanical test. In citing a US decision, “the
extent of the copying is one important factor, but only one to be taken into
account, along with several others.”67 While the court did not
schematically assess a list of factors as in CCH, it examined the nature and
purpose of the use which was found to include current news. Also, the
court considered the “market substitute” criterion noted in CCH, in that
the use of the photo was “not to gain an unfair commercial advantage over
[the plaintiff] Allen or [the magazine] Saturday Night.”68 Moreover, as in
CCH, fair dealing was also allowed within a commercial context of a
periodical publisher, The Toronto Star Newspaper Ltd.
As in CCH, Allen adopted a liberal approach and weighed the following
factors: (1) the purpose of relaying a current event was allowed in a
commercial context (2) the nature of work as an entire work such as a
photograph was fair dealing and (3) the market substitute factor allowed
the court to consider that the magazine did not seek to gain a commercial
advantage over the market for the original work.
Notably, regarding the extent of the work copied, in an earlier decision
Zamacois, an entire newspaper article was reproduced and this was not
fair dealing for purposes of criticism.69 The defendants unsuccessfully
argued that, (1) the article was necessary since another article published in
the same edition criticized the work and (2) the copied article was of
current interest of an economic or political topic. For the court, one could
not reproduce an article in full without the author’s permission of the work

67

Citing Williams & Wilkins Co v United States 417 US 907 (US Cl Ct 1974)
(“Williams & Wilkins”).

68

Allen (n 33) [38].

69

Zamacois v Douville (1943) 2 CPR 270 (Ex Ct)(Angers J) 302 [104] (“Zamacois”).
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which he criticizes.70 But this decision has come under much criticism and
as a result of CCH its precedential value is weak.71
3. MOTIVE
CCH did not apply motive, at least bad motive.72 In previous cases, such
as in Boudreau v Lin, there was no fair dealing for private study found in a
professor’s paper containing substantial copied portions of a student’s
work.73 The court zeroed in on the fraudulent nature of the dealing. The
professor had deleted the student’s name from the paper, presented it at a
conference without credit and also sold copies of it to other students.74
From this perspective, even though one of the court’s policy objectives
was to prevent the appropriation of the author’s labour, the bad faith
conduct where the professor “blatantly” breached copyright seems to have
weighed heavily in finding otherwise.75 It will be interesting to see the
extent to which future fair dealing cases account for bad faith. By contrast
in CCH, the Great Library’s closely enforced Access Policy put the
defendant in a favourable light.
4. POLICY
While CCH featured a user-centric policy oriented court, previous cases
were perhaps more mindful of the creator. In Breen v Hancock House

70

ibid.

71

eg some argue its weakness even before CCH: MF Morgan “Trash Talking: The
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Computer Software” (1994) 26 Ottawa LRev
arguing that Hubbard’s approach seems preferable.

72

The “real purpose” or “motive” was treated as a sub-factor though not applied: CCH (n
1) [54]

73

Boudreau (n 33).

74

ibid [49]

75

ibid [50-1] see for an interesting discussion of role of university to regulate activities of
its professors especially vis-à-vis its students.
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Publishers Ltd 76 an author copied substantial portions of a thesis into a
book which he later published. In denying fair dealing, the court found
that while the book enjoyed little commercial success, the defendant had
appropriated the plaintiff’s skill, time and talent.77 He had made liberal use
of about 20 to 30 pages of the thesis which comprised a qualitative
substantial portion of the author’s work.78 An interesting question here is
how can one argue otherwise for the “public interest” in the context of this
case? Can this creator be distinguished from the authors in CCH who
created decisions and secondary materials? It is unclear whether following
CCH, Breen would have had a similar result. Against the past, post-CCH
now users stand in a better position in proving fair dealing.

D. POST-CCH: HAVE COURTS POST CCH TAKEN ITS LEAD?
While there has been no copyright case on fair dealing post-CCH, cases
addressing copyright issues generally have considered CCH, namely
concerning the doctrine of originality, authorization, and general policy
principles.79
In the “Tariff 22” decision involving retransmission rights, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the need for a liberal interpretation in balancing rights of
owners and the limitations of those rights as they are not just

76

Breen v Hancock House Publishers Ltd 6 CIPR 129 (Fed Ct) (Joyal J).

77

ibid [20].

78

Curiously, the infringing author had always assumed that academic work (eg like a
thesis) was in the public domain and therefore not subject to copyright protection; ibid
[10]

79

eg R v Allen 2006 ABPC 115 (Alb PCt) [30] on originality; Columbia Pictures
Industries v Gaudreault 2006 FCA 29 (Fed CA) [32] and Columbia Pictures Industries v
Frankl 2004 FC 1454 (Fed Ct) [26] on authorization. But to date no decision has applied
the fair dealing doctrine. While a trial date has yet to be set, a new suit by Robertson
against Thomson Corp is expected to include fair dealing; namely whether the defence of
fair dealing applies to any of the infringing acts if there is no implied licence (updated as
at 9 July 2007).
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“loopholes.”80 Thus far the Copyright Board of Canada has in obiter made
some remarks on the potential applicability of the fair dealing doctrine to
licensing issues and the need for further clarification.
1. COPYRIGHT BOARD DECISIONS
In Re Media Monitoring, the Board considered tariffs filed by the
Canadian Broadcasters Rights Agency (CBRA) for commercial and noncommercial media monitors using its private broadcasters’ programs and
communication signals. While the Board did not determine the extent, if
any, to which the monitors' use of the repertoire may constitute fair
dealing, it nonetheless commented on the potential applicability of the
doctrine. It maintained that “profit-driven research may constitute fair
dealing” and “that the person who facilitates another person's fair dealing
may be entitled to the same protection under the Act as the first person.”81
And that applied to this case, it could perhaps be argued “that some
monitoring activity may constitute research or the facilitation of research,
some of which may in turn constitute fair dealing.”82Accordingly,
Until subsequent judgments clarify the portent of the CCH
decision, this leaves open the possibility that certain activities of
media monitors may not constitute protected uses for which they
would require a licence.83
In Re Breakthrough Films & Television while not a fair dealing case, the
dissenting opinion in the Copyright Board pronounced itself on its scope.84
The Board found that a television production company was justified to
obtain a retroactive licence to work belonging to an unlocatable copyright
owner it had excerpted. But for the dissent a retroactive licence should not
80

Tariff 22 [88] citing CCH (n 1) [48] which had quoted D Vaver Copyright Law (Irwin
Law Toronto 2000) 171: “User rights are not just loopholes.”

81

Re Media Monitoring (Copyright Board, March 29, 2005) [28].

82

ibid [29].

83

ibid [28].

84

Re Breakthrough Films & Television (Copyright Board, March 6, 2006).
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have been granted since there was no copyright infringement.
clarifying the full basis of its policy considerations, the dissent stated:

In

While the interests of copyright owners should be protected, so
should those of users, given the recent insistence of the Supreme
Court of Canada in balancing the rights of the former and those of
the latter. The public interest in the dissemination of works and
subject-matters also should be given some attention.85
However, fostering balance in copyright should not be at the expense of
fostering compliance with copyright rules since this has a direct impact on
licensing issues and ultimately on fair dealing. For the Board, “[u]sers
should be encouraged to evolve towards practices where licences are
sought before a work is used. The Board should not condone industry
practices that view licensing copyright as an afterthought, thereby showing
disregard for the rights of copyright owners.”86 In other words, proper
licensing is part of the copyright balance.
While retroactive licences help foster certainty, respect for copyright and
dissemination of published works, they may deprive owners from “the
right to choose between agreeing to a price and seeking compensation for
the violation of copyright that has already occurred.”87
And so, with respect to fair dealing the Board’s work may be affected
directly:
… whole areas of what are now considered to be protected uses (eg
media monitoring) might suddenly join the realm of unprotected
uses. This might have to be factored into the setting of certain
tariffs, which brings us back to the already identified difficulties
associated with applying concepts otherwise suited to an ex post
facto decision in the exercise of an ex ante jurisdiction.88
85

ibid [29].

86

ibid [30].

87

ibid [55] A copyright licence should not be treated as a “dog licence” ibid [56].

88

Bouchard (n 33).
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Thus as courts and, importantly, industry practices follow the liberal
interpretation of research in CCH to include commercial purposes this
may have a direct effect on tariff-setting.
2. NOTE ON THE EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT
Even before CCH, the Council of Ministers of Education (CMEC)
proposed an educational amendment to the CCA to permit the use of
freely available internet materials.89 While beyond the scope of this paper
to assess this proposal, it is unclear that this provision on its own will alter
the current law or practices with respect to the educational uses of
materials. Although perhaps useful to generate good will among this set of
particular stakeholders, for the long term, many more parties will need to
come to a consensus on many more matters than the mere use of internet
materials. Moreover, some scholars argue that because of CCH, the federal
government’s interventions on educational use of materials for long
distance learning and coursepacks, as proposed in Bill C-60, may be “at
best impractical and unnecessary, and at worst unenforceable”.90 As CCH
espoused, a LAM need not rely on its specific exceptions but can rely on
fair dealing. Significantly, however, fair dealing may not excuse mass
distribution of materials.91 To date, these problems remain unaddressed.
The existing governance mechanisms in the educational community do not
seem tenable. For example, academics, students and other critics are
dissatisfied with the current licensing regime.92 Very little money flows

89

see CMEC “Copyright in Education” <http://cmec.ca/copyright/copyInternet.en.stm>
(last visited June 29, 2007).

90

Wilkinson (n 24) 360. Bill C-60, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess 38th Parl
2005 was introduced in the House of Commons on 20 June 2005 died on the Order of
Paper on 28 November 2005.

91
92

ibid 369.

H Knopf “Copyright Collectivity in the Canadian Academic Community: An
Alternative to the Status Quo?” (1999-2000) 14 IJP 109.
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back to the professor/author.93 Consider that the then CanCopy “had more
than $18 million in undistributed royalties, and no apparently systematic
way of determining to whom this money belongs.”94 These types of issues
will continue to grate on students and other members of the educational
community alike from teachers and librarians to the administrators of
copyright. While CCH has liberalized greater uses of works comporting
with fair dealing (eg for educational purposes), understanding and
agreeing on any policy, law or court decision, must also be embraced (and
perhaps generated) at the grass-roots level, by the all of the parties (in
discord and accord) that are directly affected.

III. FAIR DEALING IN THE UK
The UK doctrine of fair dealing that has developed in the courts over
almost two centuries made its first statutory appearance in the UK
Copyright Act 1911.95 There has been pronounced academic debate on
UK’s fair dealing provision. Some scholars have argued that the UK
doctrine offers no principles or vision and that it contains too many
obstacles that undermine its operation.96 Yet, others maintain that UK
courts adopt a liberal interpretive approach.97
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 198898 (“CDPA”) Chapter III of the
1988 Act, sections 28 to 76, is concerned with “Acts Permitted in Relation
to Copyright Works”99 and contains the present fair dealing provisions in
93

“Few such authors are believed to earn more than $75 to $100 a Year from reprography
royalties from CanCopy” Knopf (n 92) (CanCopy is now Access Copyright).

94

ibid.

95

1 & 2 Geo 5 c 46 An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Law Relating to Copyright.

96

C Craig Fair Dealing and the Purposes of Copyright Protection (Queen’s University
Kingston, Ontario LLM Thesis August 2000).

97

L Bently and B Sherman Intellectual Property Law (2nd edn OUP Oxford 2004) 193.

98

Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 c 48 as amended (UK) (“CDPA”).

99

CDPA s 31 permits certain instances of incidental inclusion of copyrighted work; ss 32
- 36 provide for permitted uses for the purposes of education; ss 37-44 contain rules
regarding libraries and archives; s 45 - 50 concern public administration; ss 51-53 deal
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sections 29 to 30 which stipulate enumerated purposes similar to its
Canadian counterpart: (1) research or private study (2) criticism or review
and (3) reporting current events. As in Canada, at least pre-CCH, the
defendant must overcome three hurdles: (1) the dealing must fall into an
enumerated category (2) the dealing must be fair (as per the common law
criteria set out below) and (3) in the last two cases, there must be sufficient
acknowledgment.100
Against the conclusions of previous government studies, the recent
Gowers Review has not recommended that fair dealing be amended.101
Rather its recommendations follow the UK tradition to carve out specific
exceptions. Gowers recommends to add several new exceptions, among
which are those for parody and format-shifting.102 These two exceptions
have not attracted any controversy.103

with designs; sections 54-55 deal with typefaces; s 56 is about works in electronic form;
ss 57- 75 contain miscellaneous provisions; and s 76 ensures the effectiveness of defences
with respect to adaptations.
100

But for of current events by means of a sound recording, film, broadcast or cable
programme: acknowledgement is not required: s 30(3). The purported explanation for this
distinction is that on the basis that acknowledgements would unduly clutter reporting by
these forms of media. A similar provision was contained in s 6(3) of the 1956 Act.
Amended to give effect to Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society
2001/29/EC art 5(3)(c) (“Information Society Directive”).
101

An independent review led by Andrew Gowers, asked by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer last year December, one year target met; see An independent review led by
Andrew Gowers, asked by the Chancellor of the Exchequer December 2005, one year
target met; Government accepted all of the recommendations the day the Review was
tabled
in
Parliament
6
December
2006;
see
<http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/gowers_review_intellectual_property/gowersrevie
w_index.cfm> Gowers goes against previous reports: The Whitford Report: Copyright
and Designs Law, cmnd 6732 (1977) “The greater the number of special cases, the
greater the scope for uncertainty [regarding the applicability of the fair dealing defence]
in relation to cases not specifically dealt with.” [668].
102

Gowers (n 101) Recommendation 10b (format-shifting), Recommendation 12
(parody).
103

United Kingdom Patent Office (UKPO) Interview (5 February 2007).
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The UK enumerated purposes are said to be liberally construed.104 By
adopting an objective test, courts have made it reasonably easy to prove
that a dealing fits in one of these categories. Still, this liberal construction
is not consistent with CCH which arguably has expanded the actual
allowable purposes perhaps to include a parody right in a future following
of CCH.

A. WHAT HAVE THE COURTS SAID ON THE ENUMERATED
PURPOSES?
1. RESEARCH OR PRIVATE STUDY
Research and private study must be for a non-commercial purpose.105
Some UK commentators argue that a database used in market testing for a
new drug or a commercial training course would constitute research or
private study.106 It is still a difficult middle ground to determine what is
meant by commercial. Recital 42 of the Information Society Directive
mandates that one must look at the activity rather than the “organizational
structure and the means of funding the establishment”.107 One key factor
seems to be that research need not be private. Other important factors
include the amount taken, if the work is readily available, and the effect on
the market.108 It is possible for an agent to photocopy works for third
parties but there are limitations if the copying would result in substantial
dissemination of the same material.109 Arguably, this would be the same
in CCH which allowed copying subject to a fair dealing compliant access
104

Bently (n 97) 193; see Newspaper Licensing Agency v Marks & Spencer plc [1999]
EMRL 369 (“Marks & Spencer”); Pro Sieben Media AG v Carlton Television Ltd [1998]
FSR 43 (CA) (Walker LJ) (“Pro Sieben”) and Ashdown (n 29).

105

Defined in CDPA (n 98) s 178: as not including direct or indirect commercial purpose

106

Bently (n 97) 198.

107

Information Society Directive (n 100).

108

Bently (n 97) 198.

109

CDPA (n 98) s 29(3)(b); eg instructors could not make multiple copies of articles for
their students.
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policy. Still, because of CCH, in Canada, research and private study can
include commercial purposes.
In the UK, the application of this purpose has been criticized for it fails to
reflect the importance of non-textual media and it applies in a limited
fashion to computer programs.110 This purpose also does not apply for a
broadcast, sound recording or film.111
2. CRITICISM OR REVIEW
For a dealing to fit this category, the subject work must have been
previously available to the public, be fair and have sufficient
acknowledgement. In Sillitoe and Others v McGraw-Hill Book
Company,112 there was no fair dealing in the use of original summaries
incorporated into “Coles Notes.” The court found that the authors of the
Notes, used very long extracts without sufficient acknowledgement. The
Notes inclusion of brief commentaries under only some of the reproduced
summaries was not sufficient for criticism or review. In Associated
Newspapers Group Plc v News Group Ltd.113, at issue was the printing of
letters owned exclusively by the Daily Mail by a competing newspaper,
The Sun. The defendants’ motive had not been for the purpose of criticism
or review, but to “attract readers.”114 In this case, the “death of the
Duchess does [did] not require the publication of the contents of the
letters.”115 One could simply have reported the event.

110

CDPA (n 98) s 29(4)-(4A).

111

Pro Sieben (n 104).

112

[1983] FSR 545 (“Sillitoe”).

113

Associated Newspapers Group Plc v News Group Ltd [1986] RPC 515 (“Associated
Newspapers”) 518.
114

ibid.

115

Associated Newspapers (n 113) 519.

30

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 04

3. CURRENT EVENTS REPORTING
This purpose has been generally construed as news reporting, though a
recent case, Pro sieben Media AG v Carlton UK Television Ltd, has given
its scope wider interpretation.116 Broadcasters have criticized Pro Sieben
for its potentially wide applicability of current events now extending
beyond news.117 The court has not clarified the extent of its new scope.

B. THE DEALING MUST BE FAIR
Once a defendant proves that work a falls into an enumerated purpose, the
defendant must show that the dealing was fair. Hubbard v Vosper118 sets
out the main test for fairness. For some scholars Hubbard, “represents the
first major judicial attempt to define the concept of ‘fairness’ with respect
to the fair dealing provisions contained, at that time, in section 6 of the
1956 Copyright Act.”119 At issue was whether Hubbard’s book, as the
founder of the Church of Scientology of California, infringed a book
authored by a former member of the Church of Scientology, Vosper,
which he relied upon extensively for his own work. In denying an
application for an injunction, Lord Denning for the Court of Appeal
maintained that whether a dealing is fair is a matter of fact and degree and
all the circumstances of a particular case must be taken into account:120
It is impossible to define what is ‘fair dealing’. It must be a question of
degree. You must consider first the number and extent of the quotations
and extracts. Are they altogether too many and too long to be fair? Then
you must consider the use made of them. If they are used as a basis for
116

Pro Sieben (n 104) 625. The fact that a German television station had paid £30000 to
interview a woman of multiple pregnancies was “an event of limited and ephemeral
interest, but … [still] a current event”.
117

“Verdict causes stir for broadcasters” (1999) The Lawyer 22, 22.

118

[1972] 1 All E.R. 1023 (CA) (“Hubbard”).

119

Craig (n 96) 9.

120

Hubbard (n 118) 1027.
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comment, criticism or review, that may be a fair dealing. If they are used
to convey the same information as the author for a rival purpose, that may
be unfair. Next you must consider the proportions. To take long extracts
and attach short comments may be fair. Other considerations may come to
mind also. But after all is said and done, it must be a matter of
impression.”121

A court must therefore weigh the extent and proportion of the work used
in relation to the original work and uses made (eg for a rival purpose).122
An entire work may also be subject to the fair dealing defence.123 Since
the Human Rights Act of 1998, courts need to be flexible and
considerations of public interest are paramount.124 While not expressly
delineated in the legislation, from the case law, several factors emerge on
what is “fair” on the most part consistent with the Canadian jurisprudence:
1. Nature of the work: if the work is unpublished, this will weigh
against the defendant;125 in the case of confidential works (eg
private letters) this will weigh more against fair dealing than the
use of official reports of public importance.
2. How the work was obtained: if leaked or stolen it is less likely to
be fair.126
3. Amount taken: while the least amount taken favours fair dealing,
in some cases it may be fair to reproduce an entire work (eg if the
work is short, like an epitaph).127
121

ibid.

122

Craig highlights that, with respect to the relevance of a “rival purpose”, British
Broadcasting Corp v British Satellite Broadcasting Ltd Times, [1991] 2 All E.R. 833 (Ch
D), held that BSB’s rivalry with the BBC did not necessarily take its actions outside the
protection of the fair dealing defence.
123

For Megaw LJ in the context of a parish magazine reproducing a twenty word epitaph:
Hubbard (n 118) 1031.
124

Ashdown (n 29) [71].

125

Hyde Park (n 22) in the case of current events.

126

Beloff v Pressdram Ltd [1973] 1 All ER 241 (Ch D) (“Beloff”)

127

Hubbard (n 118) 94-95; 98.
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4. Uses made: the more transformative the better to favour fair
dealing (eg the more that has been added by the user the better, as
some have stated it pays to be long-winded).128
5. Commercial benefit: if the work is used for a commercial benefit
this will weigh against the defendant; one cannot derive a
commercial benefit in research, unless there is some overriding
element of public advantage.129
6. Motives for the dealing: the courts employ an objective
standard130 and consider if the motive is malevolent or altruistic.131
7. Consequences of the dealing: this factor concerns the impact of
the dealing on the market of the original work especially where
parties are in competition; if a new work acts as a substitute for the
original this weighs against fair dealing.132
8. Purpose achieved by different means: were alternatives to the
dealing available? Courts have found no fair dealing when the
written word was just as effective as actual pictures.133

C. HIERARCHY OF FACTORS
While there appears to be an open list of criteria emerging, a recent case
suggests that there is a hierarchy of factors. In Ashdown v Telegraph
Group Ltd, a UK daily newspaper unsuccessfully claimed fair dealing in
its use of confidential political material it published concerning the
pending formation of the UK government.134 While the case

128

D Vaver Copyright Part II (Osgoode Hall Law School Toronto 1998) 522.

129

Marks& Spencer (n 104) [257].

130

Hyde Park (n 125) [36].

131

Pro Sieben (n 104) 614.

132

Hubbard (n 118).

133

Hyde Park (n 125).

134

Ashdown (n 29) the public interest defence and freedom of expression claim were
also advanced.
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acknowledged Pro-Sieben’s liberal interpretation of current events135
drawing from Laddie’s text,136 the court delineated a hierarchy of factors
when deciding fair dealing, in the following order:
(1) whether there was a market substitute to the dealing (if so, fair
dealing will “most certainly fail”)
(2) whether the work was published or previously exposed to public
(if not, fair dealing will fail especially if the work was obtained by
breach of confidence or some other underhanded way – here
motive is relevant)
(3) extent of the work taken (though a substantial part or entire work
can be allowed). 137
The appellate court found that the copied extract enhanced the commercial
value of the newspaper, increasing its readership loyalty. And while some
of the matters covered in the extract had been previously disclosed in a
radio interview, the extract was obtained in breach of confidence and its
most important parts were taken.138
So although the court stated that where freedom of expression is at issue,
courts may need to place less weight than previously on these hierarchy of
factors, and more on others such as the political importance of the contents
of the work,139 copyright won out: “We do not consider it arguable that
Article 10 [of the Human Rights Act] requires that the Group [The
Telegraph] should be able to profit from this use of Mr Ashdown's
copyright without paying compensation.” 140 In other words, market
135

It might impinge upon the way in which the public would vote at the next general
election. The 'issues' identified by the Sunday Telegraph may not themselves be 'events',
but the existence of those issues may help to demonstrate the continuing public interest in
a meeting two years earlier. Ashdown (n 29) [64]
136

H Laddie, P Prescott & M Vitoria The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (3rd edn
London Butterworths 200) [20.16].
137

Ashdown (n 29) [70].

138

ibid [72]-[76].

139

ibid [71].

140

ibid [82].
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impact (which is mindful of remunerating the author) may trump freedom
of expression claims and appears to be the most important consideration.
Comparatively, in post-CCH Canada, market impact is not as important a
factor (in the UK, it is the most important). Market impact in the UK is
specifically vigilant of remunerating the author. Whether the work is
unpublished may yield opposite results in Canada (unpublished works tend
towards a finding of fairness, whereas in the UK unpublished works are
not fair). The extent of the work taken is treated similarly in Canada and in
the UK, in that it is not a factor of paramount importance. The public
interest is critical in both jurisdictions, but interpreted as a user right in
Canada and meant to account for human rights in the UK.

2007]

HEALING FAIR DEALING?

35

IV. FAIR USE IN THE US
A. US LEGISLATION
Section 107 of the US Copyright Code entrenches the jurisprudence
accumulated up to the 1976 revision and provides that the “fair use of a
copyrighted work for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research” does not infringe copyright. Although the US
offers an open list of permissible purposes against the Canadian and UK
statutes, the caselaw has generally seen similar uses exonerated under fair
use. The decision of whether a particular use is fair mandates the
consideration of four statutorily entrenched factors.
1. FOUR FAIR USE FACTORS
a. THE

PURPOSE AND CHARACTER OF THE USE, INCLUDING
WHETHER SUCH USE IS OF A COMMERCIAL NATURE OR IS FOR NONPROFIT EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES

This factor considers whether the use is commercial or should be deemed
transformative. More recently, good faith has been noted as a subfactor.141 Commercial use is but one factor and against a tide of caselaw is
no longer presumptive. In Sony Corp of America v Universal City
Studios Inc,142 a case concerning the use of the Betamax videotape
recorder used for private ‘time-shifting’ of television programs, the court
examined whether the user stood to gain from the use of copyrighted
work, not whether the user had actual motive for monetary gain. In this
case, time-shifting was found to be a non-commercial use. The court’s
obiter statement that “every commercial use of copyrighted material is

141

This was not the case initially eg in Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios
Inc 464 US 417 (SCt 1984) (“Sony”) where motive was not a factor.
142

ibid.
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presumptively unfair”143 was later embraced by subsequent courts seeking
a bright-line to interpret fair use cases, but was ultimately rejected in
Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music Inc.144
Acuff-Rose, also known as the “Pretty Woman” case, concerned the
parodic use of Roy Orbinson’s song by rap group 2 Live Crew.
Overruling the lower court, the appellate court relied on the Sony
presumption and found that fair use did not exonerate the rap group.
However, the Supreme Court later overturned this decision stating that
the commercial nature of a work should not be dispositive. Rather,
“parody, like any other relevant use, has to work its way through the
relevant factors and be judged case by case, in light of the ends of
copyright law.”145 Relying on such a presumption would have distorted
fair use and would have been “suggestive of a [US] judicial tendency to
establish bright-line rules, evolved from in-built biases or
assumptions…146 Today, in the US, there is no presumption against fair
use if the defendant makes a commercial use. Commercial uses tend to
weigh in favour of the plaintiff.147 CCH thus goes beyond US fair use, as
the commercial nature can be one consideration and must not be one
factor always considered.
In Rogers v Koons,148 Koons a successful artist sculpted a “String of
Puppies” to parody the plaintiff’s photograph of eight “Puppies” which
had enjoyed wide commercial success. In doing so, he also used an
enlarged photocopy of the puppies. The court rejected the parody
argument, as Koons could have expressed the parody without directly
copying Rogers' work. Koons' work was not commenting directly on the

143

ibid 451.

144

510 US 569 (SCt 1994) (“Acuff-Rose”).

145

Harper & Row (n 26) 1172.

146

Craig (n 96) 128.

147

ibid 125. This was the real intention of the court to set up a “balancing of the fair use
factors”.
148

Rogers v Koons 960 F 2d 301 (2d Cir 1992).
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work itself, but rather on a general idea, so there was no need to copy.
Also the court found bad faith and copying for profit-making motives.149
Basic Books v Kinko Press, is the US “coursepacks” case where uses of
copyrighted material for educational purposes by a commercial enterprise
were not fair use. The four factors were analyzed. The copying was non
transformative and was on a commercial scale. 150 While it was unclear
how much profit Kinko made, the court found it important that Kinko had
the intention of making profits.151 And so, its motives were only
“purportedly altruistic.”152 This case can be contrasted with Williams &
Wilkins where a government department copied articles from medical
journals and disseminated them to researchers and personnel who
requested them. The court found that the purposes of study and research
were acceptable as these were socially useful objectives and not “true to
photocopy shops, which reproduce for profit.”153 Further, the libraries had
established fair use guidelines and did not charge a fee.
A court post-CCH could yield similar holdings: accounting for parody
and educational uses of works by government departments. In the UK,
however, parody would still be prohibited.
b. THE NATURE OF THE COPYRIGHTED WORK
For this factor courts consider whether the work is factional or fictional
and whether published or unpublished. If there is substantial creativity,
this tends to favour the owner.

149

ibid 310.

150

“The effort utilized in this case was questionable at best and the level of judgment
practically non-existent.” 758 F Supp 1522 (NY Dt 1991) (“Kinko”) 1529.
151

ibid.

152

ibid. “The insistence that theirs [motives] are educational concerns and not
profitmaking ones boggles the mind.”

153

cited in Kinko (n 150)1535; this can be contrasted with American Geophysical Union
v Texaco 37 F3d 882 (2d Cir 1994): a class action by 82 scientific publishers against
Texaco for copying its works to which it subscribed without paying royalties.
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With respect to unpublished works, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc v
Nation Enterprises154 seemed to have instilled a presumption against fair
use for unpublished works which was followed by lower courts. But
Congress responded to the publishing industry’s concerns and overruled
this presumption.155 In this case, a magazine (the Nation) published
unauthorized quotations from former US president Ford’s unpublished
memoirs. The court analyzed the four factors and denied fair dealing.
Specifically, the court reasoned that the author has the right to control the
first appearance of the work, as part of the right of first publication which
encompasses the choice of whether to publish at all, when, where and in
what form.156 In this case, the court found that Ford’s memoirs were
subject to a confidentiality agreement and that any article produced from
it would need approval. Further, the Nation’s “clandestine” publication
afforded no opportunity for the author’s “creative or quality control” and
contained a number of “inaccuracies”.157 The court found that the
unauthorized quotations focused on “the most expressive elements of the
work, [which] exceeds that necessary to disseminate facts.”158 In Basic
Books while the court did not find fair dealing it noted that because the
nature of the works was for educational purposes this factor weighed in
their favour.159 The US and UK seem consistent in their interpretation of
this factor, against the Canadian approach favouring users disseminating
unpublished works.
c. THE

AMOUNT AND SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE PORTION USED IN
RELATION TO THE COPYRIGHTED WORK AS A WHOLE.

This factor leads to a sliding scale: as the dealing goes above a de
minimis use it more likely goes against fair use. Courts still focus on what
and not how much is used—the quality over the quantity of the taking is
154

Harper & Row (n 26) 546.

155

Fair Use of Unpublished Works Publ No 102-492 (1992) 102d Cong 2d Sess., 106 Sat
3145 codified at 17 USC 107.
156

Harper & Row (n 26) 562.

157

ibid.

158

ibid.

159

Kinko (n 26) 1533.
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critical. In Basic Books entire chapters were copied and meant to stand
alone therefore both quantitively and qualitatively significant. In Harper
& Row the court focused on quantity and quality: though insubstantial,
the extracts were the “heart of the book.”160 In Acuff-Rose, 2 Live Crew
departed from the ‘heart’ and produced distinctive lyrics. Though when
weighed with the character of use, entire works may be fair use. On the
whole, as in Canada and the UK this factor seems like the least
significant.
d. THE EFFECT OF THE USE UPON THE POTENTIAL MARKET FOR OR
VALUE OF THE COPYRIGHTED WORK.
Harper & Row signaled this last factor as the single most important factor
especially if the use becomes widespread and undermines the author’s
potential market (since for the court the purpose of copyright is also to
161
provide incentive to authors).
Some lower courts have followed this
162
Still, it is difficult for courts to anticipate the curtailment of the
dictum.
163
potential market as it can be like gazing in a crystal ball.

In Basic Books the purchase of the coursepacks was found to undermine
the need to purchase full texts. The court also held that this would impact
out-of-print books whose licence fees constituted a significant source of

160

Harper & Row (n 26) 565. In the case of parody, Harper & Row found this factor not
very helpful because the parody necessarily must “go to the original’s ‘heart’ since the
‘heart’ is what conjured up the song for parody; ibid 586-89; eg first line of lyrics and
characteristic opening bass riff.
161

“More important, to negate fair use one need only show that if the challenged use
‘should become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the
copyrighted work.’ Harper& Row (n 26) 567 following Sony (n 141) 451 [emphasis in
original]; isolated instances of infringements “become in the aggregate a major inroad on
copyright that must be prevented.” Harper & Row (n 26) 567
162

eg Arica Inst Inv v Palmer 970 F2d 1067 (2nd Cir 1992) 1078; Los Angeles News Serv
v Tullo, 973 F 2d 791 at 798 (9th Cir 1992); Cable/Home Communication Corp v
Network Prods Inc 902 F.2d 829 at 845 (11th Cir 1990).
163

Nunez v Caribbean Intern News Corp 235 F3d 18 (1st Cir 2000) on market of
photographs. Though it is clear that bootlegged CDs or software unfair. US v Slater 348
F3d 666, 669 (where there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to instruct on fair use in
criminal trial concerning unauthorized distribution of software).
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income.164 Generally, in parody it is difficult that the work will act as a
market substitute, as parody and the original serve different market
functions.165 But in Rogers v Koons there was a presumption that the
sculpture would harm the plaintiff’s future market.166 And on an earlier
motion for summary judgment in Acuff-Rose, the absence of evidence on
the effect of the parody on the nonparody market (eg Orbison’s market)
caused the defendant to lose.167 In the US, market substitute is therefore a
very important factor, in the UK, the most important and in Canada not as
important and when considered CCH appears to place the onus of proof
on the plaintiffs.
Irrespective of the US’s statutory entrenchment of the four factors, it is
still very difficult to determine a fair dealing and assess which if any
factor is determinative.
In other words, each of the four US statutory criteria require mandatory
consideration in every case. As Acuff-Rose held there are no bright lines,
few presumptions, and there must be a sensitive balancing of interests.
Some argue that these criteria may enhance predictability but have
reduced the flexibility available to the US court; others maintain that
there is no predictability, it is difficult to articulate what fair use is, but
that there is flexibility with emerging technologies.168 Ultimately, not all
factors have to be fair for the end use to be fair and similarly, some
factors can be fair but the end result is an unfair use.

164

Kinko (n 150) 1534.

165

Relying on Sony (n ) 451; Harper & Row (n 26) 590-594.

166

Rogers (n 148) 312. An example is raised on a movie adaptation of a book impacting
the potential market of selling the book’s adaptation rights.
167
168

Harper & Row (n 148) 590-594.

eg C Correa “Fair Use in the Digital Era” (Unesco Paris 2000).
http://webworld.unesco.org/infoethics2000/documents/paper_correa.rtf (29 June 2007)
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2. “OTHER” FAIR USE FACTORS
In the recent case of Basic Books, the court considered other factors,
besides the enumerated four factors:
a. MONOPOLISTIC AND COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
In Basic Books, the defendant Kinko created a new “nationwide
business” allied to the publishing industry by usurping the plaintiff’s
copyrights and profits.169 Kinko had two hundred stores across the
country and it was difficult for the plaintiff to challenge the defendant.
Kinko asserted that the plaintiffs misused their copyrights and
monopolized the industry in an effort to thwart the copying market and
restrain competition.170 While Kinko advanced anecdotal evidence that
there were unreasonable delays, undue response times and high costs in
obtaining copyrighted materials for the courses, the court found no clear
evidence. Importantly, the court implied that had there been such
evidence, then this would have weighed in favour of fair use. The court
seems to leave this door open for future cases. That is, fair dealing may be
found if the defendant is able to show that the plaintiff engaged in
monopolistic practices. In CCH, this factor was considered though the
plaintiff had the burden of proof and failed to meet it.
b. INDUSTRY PRACTICES AND INSTITUTIONAL POLICIES
In Basic Books, the court noted that the defendant had violated
“Classroom Guidelines” prohibiting the use of anthologies. Moreover, the
court observed that the defendant had not advanced evidence that an
instructor would be disabled without the use of the coursepacks. The
court considered Williams & Wilkins where the library copying was
subject to guidelines within fair use and did not charge a fee.171 Following
institutional guidelines within fair dealing is also very important in CCH
as the court relied heavily on the Great Library’s Access Policy for a
finding of fairness. So, if the defendant can show adherence to policies
169

Kinko (n 150) 1534.

170

ibid. 1538.

171

ibid. 1535 citing Williams & Wilkins (n 67).
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within fair dealing/fair use this factor will likely weigh strongly in their
favour.

C. FAIR USE IS “ILL”
Before proceeding to outline some comparative threads among the three
jurisdictions, some remarks must be made on the burgeoning body of
scholarship, studies and reports criticizing US fair use. Fair use is said to
be “ill, though hardly dead yet.”172 Peter Jaszi argues that claims of US
fair use superiority are often misguided and many others have called on
Congress to clarify fair use.173 There has been no shortage of solutions
proposed.174 But to date Congress has resisted changing fair use. The
courts have also failed to simplify fair use by attempting to establish
bright-line presumptions (1) that commercial uses are unfair,175 (2)
favouring plaintiff’s unpublished works,176 and (3) more recently, that
works must be transformative to constitute fair use.177 Moreover, it is
increasingly expensive to mount litigation to clarify the scope of use and
some users may be risk-averse to begin with. The American Intellectual
Property Law Association estimates the average cost to defend a copyright
case to be just under one million US dollars.178
172

W Gordon “Keynote Fair Use: Threat or Threatened” (2004-2005) 55 Case W Reserve
LRev 912 arguing that overbroad contract rules and the DMCA are the true threats to fair
use.
173

P Jaszi “Public Interest Exceptions in Copyright” [copy with author]; MW Carroll
“Fixing Fair Use” "Fixing Fair Use". North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 85, 2007
available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=945194> 4.
174

Jessica Litman proposing an unfair competition standard for infringement; Michael
Madison thinks that fair use should be re-written with more flexibility so that social
practices that can benefit from fair use inform the analysis. See Carroll (n 173) 11 for
about a half page footnote detailing all of these sources.
175

Presumption arose in Sony (n 141).

176

Congress amendment: “The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a
finding of fair use” 17 USC s 107 (2000) see discussion in Gordon (n 172) 910.

177

Acuff-Rose (n 144) seconded Sony’s rejection, along with recent cases such as Nunez
(n 163) exonerating nontransformative or exact copies of works.
178

Cited in White Paper (n 24) 57.
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Although fair use’s attention to context is certainly salutary, “it is so casespecific that it offers precious little to artists, educators, journalists,
Internet speakers, other” who want to use the copyrighted work.179
Google’s digitization project of large library collections is a recent sign
that in the digital age, issues of fair use have taken on urgency.180
The Chilling Effects Report documents the culture of anxiety that now
exists as rights holders aggressively attempt to thwart potential fair uses of
works.181 Via private cease-and-desist letters, online service providers
frequently cull user materials in order to earn a place in the “safe harbour”
zone.182 And because the material is removed privately, no court examines
the validity in advance of takedown. Further, a recent report from the
Brennan Centre for Justice, “Will Fair Use Survive?” identifies in addition
to cease-and-desist letters, notice and takedown, narrow industry “fair use
guidelines” and an overzealous “clearance culture.”183 And more recently,
the “Digital Learning Challenge” White Paper focuses specifically on the
educational sector, calling for clearer fair use rules. The study reveals that
the trend is for educators to clear for fear and license unnecessarily
multiple copies of works for classroom use (typically allowed by
statute).184 Doing so out of excessive caution, when fair use would
179

D Nimmer “Fairest of them All’ and other Fairy Tales of Fair Use” (2003) 66 Law &
Contemp Probs 263, 280 “had Congress legislated a dartboard rather than the four fair
use factors… it appears that the upshot would be the same.”
180

In Author’s Guild et al v Google (filed September 20, 2005 in NY DCt) Google is
arguing fair use in defence.
181

Chilling Effects (n 24) eg merely providing a link to content on another website.

182

s 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) Pub L No 105-304, 112
Stat 2860 (Oct 28, 1998) provides “safe harbour” from copyright infringement.
183

M Heins and T Beckles “Will Fair Use Survive?” New York Brennan Center for
Justice 2005 <http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf>
184

White Paper (n 24) 57 documenting: “Comment of the University of Texas System,
<http://www.copyright.gov/disted/comments/init020.pdf> at 5 indicating that the
University seeks licenses for all copyrighted material, for lack of confidence in
protections provided by fair use; but see Comment of the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill provided in White Paper (n 24) indicating that the university encourages
professors to take advantage of the fair use doctrine for one-time or first uses of
copyrighted material.
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otherwise apply, is harmful.185 There is also extensively documented
evidence of burdensome and uneven licensing systems and arrangements
within schools.186
What is more, there is a clear and negative interface between digital rights
management (DRM) technologies and fair use.187 For instance, smaller
schools (such as elementary and secondary schools) in the US lacking
resources (and potentially skills) are precluded from licensing works if
they do not comply with DRM requirements imposed by rights holders to
begin with.188 The implications are that there is less use of content
otherwise available and if available, prohibited from access because of the
lack of resources. And while educators are generally averse to
technological protection measures, they may use them nonetheless to
ensure the integrity of their works and attribution of their efforts, and
enforcement of how their works may be used. Also, educational
institutions themselves, concerned with a return on investment, endorse
DRM systems.189 As such, rights holders are not the only parties
responsible for limiting access to digital works.190
The White Paper concludes that the judicial interpretation of the DMCA’s
anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions to exclude fair use and
other copyright exemptions as defences to actions under the DMCA
“stripped educational users of their shield against copyright infringement
liability…”191

185

White Paper (n 24) 58.

186

ibid 60-63.

187

Much scholarship exists eg S Blythe “The US Digital Millennium Copyright Act and
the EU Copyright Directive: Comparative Impact on Fair Use” (2006) 8 Tul JTech and
Intell Prop 111, 129.
188

White Paper (n 24) 52.

189

ibid. 54.

190

Here it is noteworthy that a Creative Commons type licence is used increasingly to
achieve these means.
191

White Paper (n 24) s 4.2.4. on Educational Impact.
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1. LIMITS OF TEACH ACT
The Technology, Education and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2001
(“TEACH Act”) which promised to update educational use exemptions in
light of technological developments has not delivered.192 The TEACH Act
was the product of compromise among the stakeholder community and the
result of a full study Congress conducted in 1998.193 The TEACH Act: (1)
expanded the types of content that could be used (2) allowed the
digitization and short-term retention of content, and (3) eliminated a
provision in the US copyright legislation that required students to be
physically on location.
Nonetheless, many strictures make the Act unworkable and unreliable and
ultimately of little value. While it deals with online learning, it is very
specific on what may be used without first obtaining permission.194 An
educational institution must also be not for profit and accredited.
As the White Paper notes, the user must use technological protection
measures (which often necessitate financial resources) and the actual use
of technological protection measures “may eviscerate the TEACH Act all
together.”195 The TEACH ACT “failed to create a safe harbor it promised,
effectively leaving educations users of digital content without legal
recourse to make use of such works.”196 The White Paper recommends to
revise the TEACH ACT.197

192

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476.

193

Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School “Digital Learning
and Legal Background Paper: The TEACH ACT—The Impact of Copyright and
Compromise
on
Digital
Distance
Education”
at
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/dl_teachact> (18 June 2007).
194

R Fry “Copyright Issues in E-learning” (2004) 3:2 Copyright and New Media
Newsletter. See also <http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/scc/legislative/teachkit/> (19 June 2007)
195

White Paper (n 24) 34.

196

ibid. 54.

197

ibid. 71.
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And so, as it is not meant to alter fair use, fair use seems to be the
preferred vehicle of choice in the distance learning environment.198
Though as explored fair use comes with its own uncertainties.
2. REASONS FOR OPTIMISM: BEST PRACTICES
The White Paper notes some grounds for optimism as (1) it views
“educational uses” under the fair use doctrine to be likely permissible, and
(2) there are virtually no decisions that apply fair use directly to
educational defendants who made educational use of their contents. The
only cases are those of commercial “coursepack” publishers, but not of the
teachers making nonprofit educational uses of content.199 A high profile
case where New York University was the defendant was settled in 1983
before any decision was reached.200 The White Paper posits that this neartotal absence of lawsuits against educators, “may suggest that rights
holders have tacitly accepted that the appropriate construction of the fair
use doctrine leaves significant room for educational uses of content, or
that they fear a negative public reaction if they sue educators.”201 Indeed,
some universities encourage that professors rely on the fair use doctrine
for one-time or first uses of copyrighted material.202 But the cases of
comfort are limited, and the vast majority of users (from teachers,
librarians, lawyers and educational administrators) face fear and anxiety
over acceptable uses of content.203
Some of these stakeholders are trying to clarify the scope of fair use
through self-help.204 Particularly, stakeholders have come together to
198
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establish best practices at the university and industry-specific levels. The
most successful and comprehensive initiative is a recent one from the
documentary film-makers’ industry.205 Diverse stakeholders from the
creators to the producers to the insurers have come together and developed
a statement on “Best Practices in Fair Use.” This 2005 document has been
well-received and there is evidence that other industries are following
suit.206 These initiatives are most promising since clarification,
understanding and respect for copyright use, creation and dissemination
will best occur at the grass-roots level. Parties directly involved in the
industry and therefore presumably more knowledgeable can formulate best
practices. As in the film-makers’ case, the insurers who will have been
involved in this consensus-building can then confidently “sign off” and
generate more possibilities for a greater variety of works for the public.
These best practices can be thus applied by the creators to insurers of
copyright and, eventually, as interpretive aids by the judges in the courts
in the benefit of the public at large.
In the US, attempts to agree on industry-wide guidelines for fair use have
failed. The most prominent example was the Commission on Fair Use
(CONFU) which met regularly throughout the 1990s.207 This ambitious
attempt at a blanket approach indicates that more tailor-made culturalspecific solutions are necessary and attainable for fair use of copyrighted
works.

V. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
While Canada and the UK appear to have a more rigid “fair dealing”
framework, and the US a more flexible structure, the results of what has
been generally considered fair dealing/fair use have been on the most part
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similar. 208 David Vaver argues that even before CCH, Canadian courts
applied similar criteria, the only difference was that fair use may have
applied to any situation, not merely one enumerated.209 Today, unlike the
UK, Canada’s enumerated grounds are no longer rigid. CCH has expanded
Canada’s purposes since these should not be given restrictive
interpretation. With respect to the criteria, while the US has a statutorily
entrenched four-factor approach (but with some other factors that have
been considered, eg monopolistic practices, industry custom) CCH has
considered six factors with these more or less serving as a future guiding
framework. It is expected that other unnamed factors may be considered in
future cases. In other words, the Canadian factors can now be seen as more
flexible than those in the US. For the UK, criteria has emerged from the
caselaw consonant to Canada’s pre-CCH framework, and in many ways
there is now a hierarchy.

A. HIERARCHY OF FACTORS, NOT NUMBER OF FACTORS
The jurisdictional differences are apparent in the type of factors given
more weight, and not entirely in the number of factors named. Or put
differently, examining the hierarchy of factors, as existent in the UK,
reveals the courts’ approach. A useful exercise is to revisit the CCH
factors compared to those considered in the US and UK.
While the character, amount, effect and alternatives of the dealing (CCH
factors 2, 3, 4, 6) are similar in each jurisdiction, the purpose and nature of
the work (CCH factors 1 and 5) contain some differences.
1. PURPOSE (AND COMMERCIAL NATURE OF THE DEALING)

208

Eg fair dealing/fair use was used exonerate newspapers for using third party
photographs to illustrate a news story: Allen (n 33) and Nunez (n 163) but course-book
compilers have been liable for reproducing journal articles and book chapters: Boudreau
(n 33); Princeton University Press v Michigan Document Services 99 F3d 1381 (6th Cir
1996).
209

Vaver (n 6) 150.

2007]

HEALING FAIR DEALING?

49

The purpose of the dealing (and its commercial nature) is the factor that
seems to be most undermined in CCH, yet most pronounced in the UK (as
being on the top of the hierarchy, indeed commercial is only allowed in
review and criticism) and one of four significant factors in the US.
2. NATURE OF THE WORK
Each jurisdiction considers this factor, except that CCH has now curiously
pronounced the opposite holding: if a work is unpublished it weighs in
favour of fair dealing. In the UK and the US, if a work is unpublished it
weighs against fair dealing. This interpretation reveals in particular the
court’s penchant to favour users.
The role of other factors that were considered pre-CCH in Canada, and are
currently key factors in the US and UK, is questionable. For instance, the
role of bad faith was not present in CCH, arguably as there was none. Still
this was not highlighted expressly as a potential factor. This silence does
not mean that it cannot feature in future cases – as the factors were more
or less six.

B. OTHER FACTORS
The real differences lie in the policy preoccupations held by the respective
courts. In Canada, it is clear that the shift is one championing the rights of
users to “balance” copyright. Though as noted, it is not at all clear where
the creators fit in this schema, and further, creators are repeatedly
conflated with right holders. This could not be further from the realities of
copyright practices. Perhaps in the UK since commercial exploitation is at
the fore of judicial concern one can argue that right holder interests are
paramount. In the US, the pendulum swings back and forth among the
various stakeholders. At bottom, it is difficult to regulate these policy
preoccupations with certainty. The most effective regulator may be the
public climate (as has been the case in Canada in advancing user rights)
and corresponding best practices that need to be articulated.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
An obvious question at this late stage is to ask whether Canada’s fair
dealing is ill? While perhaps not ill, fair dealing in Canada may have the
common cold or, may have been ill and is now in convalescence. So while
surgery may not be necessary some attention may be due. Potential
remedies become apparent and (in the spirit of CCH) there may be others
that are worth considering, not noted below.

A. DO NOTHING?
Doing nothing would involve waiting to see other cases apply CCH and
industry and the Canadian general public muddling about trying to find
their own way through allowable uses. Sanctioning this copyright
convalescence does not seem to be an appropriate response. Indeed,
legislative initiatives for other copyright matters are presently under
serious consideration (eg technological protection measures which may
affect fair dealing). Arguably, these initiatives will make copyright more
expansionist than it already is. Further, there remains a high degree of
uncertainty in the varying copyright sectors, such as the educational
sector. In the US, the uncertainty in the educational fair use has very
recently led to the Copyright Clearance Center offering blanket licences
for academic institutions.210 However, there are strong arguments to
suggest that this may not be the way forward.211

B. LEGISLATE CCH FACTORS?
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It has been suggested that government intervene and legislate the CCH
factors. It is not clear how this would be done since the court was clear
that there are more or less six. More importantly, why would this be done?
What Canada now has is a flexible framework to evaluate fair dealing on a
case by case basis based on the ethos that users have rights. This seems
fairly clear and will be applied and adapted to future cases, in the common
law way. The fair dealing enumerated purposes can be interpreted in the
same fashion. CCH has set a strong precedent and unless Parliament
disagrees with any of its pronouncements it seems inopportune to
intervene at this time. Legislating CCH may invite even more confusion.

C. CHERRY-PICK OTHER LAWS?
Some commentators have championed that Canada adopt US fair use. This
would entail “cherry-picking” from the US cadre of copyright laws and
taking from it its fair use provision. There are problems with this
approach. First, as noted from eminent US studies, fair use is “ill” and not
the panacea approach that many, perhaps in Canada, proclaim. Because
fair use is ill, it has by necessity engendered many fix-it approaches, some
by the courts themselves attempting to impose bright-lines (eg
presumptions on commercial uses) and by industry players attempting to
institute best practices. Second, cherry-picking a law, likely also means
taking from its jurisprudence (and neglecting other constitutive factors,
such as a Constitution). Would Canadian courts apply US fair use cases?
Would this application ignore the fact that property is not constitutionally
entrenched in Canada? Singapore has cherry-picked US fair use, however
its courts are reluctant to consider US fair use cases causing much
disorder. This approach would cause more perplexity than currently exists.
One must be very careful when importing legal devices from other
jurisdictions.
In this context, it is also useful to consider whether fair dealing
necessitates clarification to encompass important (and new) uses. In the
UK, Gowers recommended that the government should enact a new
copyright exception for parody. Before CCH many scholars posited that
parodies would be infringing in Canada. Post CCH’s liberal interpretation
of the enumerated grounds, it could be argued that “criticism” could now
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encompass parody. Michelin no longer seems good law. Indeed, parody in
the US is not an automatic. Parody still requires analysis of each of the
four factors as well as some use of the target to be fair.212 This can now
also be the case in Canada and would likely not require any legislative
intervention.
Similarly, time-shifting that comports with fair dealing criteria could now
be allowed in Canada, as it has long been in the US. In the UK, Gowers is
again recommending a copyright exception but for format-shifting. With
respect to Crown copyright, CCH clarifies that the copying of judicial
decisions is permissible and it is likely that other government works used
in a similar fashion would also be.213 Still, in Canada because of Crown
copyright more work is subject to protection, which is not the case in the
US but very much the reality in the UK and there are no plans in that
country to address this. This issue may require more consideration.
In the ambit of the educational sector, while questionable as to whether
specific provisions, even amending fair dealing (such as adding
‘educational uses’ as an enumerated ground), are useful or even necessary,
it does seem apparent that clarification (and not necessarily of the legal
type) is critical across the various sectors. One disadvantage of introducing
a new law is that it may take time before the quick fix that is sought is
achieved and may never be achieved. New practices will develop to likely
test the limits of the new law through more court cases, thereby inviting
access to justice issues for the more disadvantaged parties. And so, if
clarity is the goal it is unclear that it can be attained in the immediate
future in this way.

D. FAIR DEALING BEST PRACTICES?
Rather than (or at least complimentary to) reforming the law, fair dealing
best practices are most promising. The parties directly affected in a
212
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specific industry can together develop these guidelines which can
ultimately aid in fair dealing decision-making in the courts. There have
already been successful guidelines or best practices generated in the US
where stakeholders with apparent disparate interests in the documentary
film-making sector have devised fair use best practices. The interest is also
apparent internationally and locally, though from a common set of
stakeholder interests (eg within universities and libraries in both Canada
and the US). In Canada, most educational institutions have devised
copyright policies to deal with the use of copyrighted materials by its
patrons. The Great Library of Toronto continues to have one.214 Osgoode
Hall Law School and York University have developed a policy.215
Concordia University has a policy (which appends the Copyright Act) and
has also struck working groups to study these issues.216 Indeed, libraries
continue to play an important role in the negotiation, implementation, and
managing of licences. Staff are asked to regularly enforce and interpret
copyright issues for compliance.217 These are promising starts, but more
concerted industry efforts as spearheaded by the US documentary filmmakers can and should be emulated.

More parties with conflicting interests within a set sector need to come
together. As noted, this can clarify fair dealing uses for all from the
creators, users, right holders to the courts, who can then rely on these
standards as “soft law” when interpreting fair dealing cases. These
initiatives can and should be encouraged to flourish and will at worst, help
foster communication and dialogue among different parties. But the
benefits can be far more reaching and consequential to future fair dealing
(and general) copyright practices. CCH favours parties that abide by their
214
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institutional access policies, their case could be more persuasive if such
policies were consistent across their industry. Such context specific
guidelines should be developed to ensure that all parties are compliant
with copyright and in healthy agreement.

E. CLARIFY COPYRIGHT ACT? CLARIFY POLICY OBJECTIVES?
Just as one cannot cherry-pick laws from other countries, it is difficult to
cherry-pick problems and solve problems within the Canadian copyright
system. Fair dealing cannot be addressed in a vacuum. One must revisit
the entire CCA and study what its objectives are, where the balance is
being struck. Are right holders the so-called winning parties? Whose
interests is copyright law meant to serve?
As noted in various parts of this paper, the question remains where is the
author/creator? CCH does not appear to account for her. The Copyright
Board has also flagged this oversight. In the current Canadian judiciary,
public and academic copyright climate, creators’ “rights”, if one can still
use the two words together, le droit d’auteur, seems to be a term of the
past or one romanticized and stuck within the civilian tradition and
vanishing from the Canadian common law tradition.218 Creators remain
subject to industry power imbalances which are facilitated by the CCA
(allowing freedom of contract and in practice favouring right holders) and
facilitated by the courts (undermining creators, but championing another
stakeholder previously ill-addressed, the users). Author-centric provisions
may thus be necessary (accounting for the role of contract and moral
rights) to balance liberalized fair dealing and potential future exceptions
and right holder centric existing provisions. In this context, as an example
of eschewing a fragmented fix-it approach, addressing the issue of the
various types of damages available and the requisite levels of proof is also
an important matter and needs consideration in light of the different types
of infringement and infringers.
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And when all is said and done, if copyright balance is found, the next
more important question is whether the CCA is clear enough to
communicate this balance. Are the CCA’s objectives embraced by the
practices of stakeholders, the courts and so on? One hindrance may be the
lack of clarity in the CCA. Simplifying and clarifying the CCA was
flagged as a long term priority in the Section 92 Report and should not to
be forgotten in the short term.

